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CASE COMMENTS
estate. On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
the lower court erred in admitting the testator's will to probate as a
will of personalty. An analysis similar to that in Clark was used by
first looking to the traditional conflict of laws rule. Applying this
rule, the testator's will was not valid as to personality since it did
not satisfy the laws of his domicile. The pertinent portion of the
Virginia Code, section 64-55 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 64-51 and 64-52 ... the
will of a person domiciled out of this State at the time of his
death shall be valid as to personal property in this State, if
it be executed according to the law of the State or country in
which he was so domiciled. 35
Because it was not faced with it, the court did not go on to the vital
question presented in Clark. Had the argument been presented, how-
ever, that by focusing on the word notwithstanding, section 64-55
could be interpreted as an alternative to section 64-51 of the Vir-
ginia Code,36 a contrary conclusion could have been reached. Sec-
tion 64-51, Virginia's general statute of wills, makes no differentation
between domiciliary and nondomiciliary wills. Under this approach
-the use of Florida law via section 64-55 could be precluded and the
use of Virginia law via section 64-51 would control the determina-
tion of -the will as to personal property. However, section 65-55
was treated rather summarily as a preemption of section 64-51 and
as a reiteration of the traditional conflict of laws rule that wills
of personal property are governed by the law of the testator's domi-
cile at date of death.
Presented with this vital question, whether an established con-
flict of laws rule is changed by statute, Clark offers a very capable
guide -to the type of analysis that could be made and should re-
ceive substantial consideration by the attorneys and courts of other
states when faced with a similar situation.
WILLAMt E. WINTER, JR.
HOUSING VIOLATIONS VOID LEASE-
A NEW TENANT'S REMEDY
Inadequate housing is a major concern of today's cities, a problem
often aggravated by the presence of slum housing and perhaps mi-
'VA. CODE ANN § 64-55 (1950) (emphasis added).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64-51 (1950).
1968]
336 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV
nority group housing.' Landlords in such areas are in a position not
only to demand high rents, but also to avoid making repairs. It is
not surprising, therefore, that there has been pressure for govern-
mental action or judicial reform.
The recent ruling in Brown v. Southall Realty Company2 has been
called "a slumfighter's dream" 3 and "the most important decision
obtained in a housing case since the Office of Economic Opportunity
Legal Services Program was started in 1965."4 Brown arose out of a
landlord's action for possession of the leasehold because of nonpay-
ment of rent. It was alleged that rent was in arrears in the amount
of $23o.oo, but the tenant contended that because the landlord had
been aware of certain violations of the Housing Code Regulations
prior to the signing of the lease, the lease should be declared void
and unenforceable and that no rent should be due. Brown found
that the lease had been entered into knowingly in violation of Sections
2304 and 2501 of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations, which
require leased premises to be in repair and vermin-free.5 To uphold
the lease in light of defects which the landlord knew to be existing
prior to the lease agreement would "flout the evident purposes for
which Sections 2304 and 2501 were enacted." The court held that
the lease was void because violations of the Housing Code existed
prior to the lease agreement and that no rent was due under the
lease.
7
A recent study has suggested that none of the three traditional
'Fossum, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 3o6 (1965).
2237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
3Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1968, at BI, col. 1.
4
d.
Section 2304 as quoted by Brown reads: "No persons shall rent or offer to
rent any habitation, or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation and its
furnishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair, and free from
rodents or vermin." 237 A.2d at 836. Section 25oi reads, "Every premises accomodat-
ing one or more habitations shall be maintained and kept in repair so as to
provide decent living accommodations for the occupants. This part of the Code
contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the
elements; its purpose is to include repairs and maintenance designed to make a
premises or neighborhood healthy and safe." Id.
6237 A.2d at 836.
7The Brown court stated: "The more reasonable view is, therefore, that where
such conditions exist on a leasehold prior to an agreement to lease, the letting of
such premises constitutes a violation of Sections 2304 and 2501 of the Housing
Regulations, and that these Sections do indeed 'imply a prohibition' so as 'to
render the prohibited act void.' Neither does there exist any reason to treat a
lease agreement differently from any other contract in this regard." 237 A.2d
at 837.
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sanctions against landlord misconduct-fines, forced vacancy of the
building thus depriving the landlord of his rent, and statutory liens
against the property for improvements made by city officials-has been
successful in solving the problem of the slum or indigent tenant.8 The
principal sanction in the District of Columbia Housing Regulations
is a maximum penalty of $3oo.oo fine or ten days' imprisonment.9
The Brown court declared that the original lease was void and
unenforceable because of its nonadherence to the housing regulations.
By so holding, the court has extended a basic contract principle' °
concerning illegal leases to the area of known housing code viola-
tions prior to leasing. It has been suggested that courts have begun
to look more and more toward well established contract principles
in solving difficult landlord-tenant problems," and Brown dearly
treated the lease agreement as it would any other contract.12 A well
established contract principle is that a contract which violates a pro-
vision of a municipal ordinance
13 or of a state or federal statute
14
is illegal and void. Public police regulations have been read to void
private leases for unlawfully maintaining a gambling establishment,' 5
illegally selling liquors,16 and maintaining an illegal house of prostitu-
8Fines or small jail sentences are provided for in nearly all housing codes, but
these are often treated as a cost of doing business. Requirements that defective
buildings be vacated until repaired have often resulted in depriving people of
the only homes available as well as causing neighborhoods to decline because of
vacated buildings. A third technique, that of allowing the city to make needed
repairs and to recover the expense either through rent collection or statutory
liens, has been thought to infringe upon the owner's due process protection. 69
HARV. L. REV. 1115, 1123- 4 (1956).
0WAsHNGToN, D.C., HOUSING REGULATION § 2104 (1955). For a statement of
this regulation see Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 Gao. L.J. 519, 523 (1966). In i96o the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia indicated in a personal injuries suit that the public
policy purpose for which the code was passed (Section 21o0) also imposed upon
the landlord the duty to maintain the leasehold in a safe condtion and to "put
the premises in safe condition prior to their rental." Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Manage-
ment Co., 282 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
'0 See, e.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922); Hartman v. Lubar, 133
F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 73 (1962).
"'rhe Brown court concluded: "Neither does there exist any reason to treat a
lease agreement differently from any other contract in this regard." 237 A.2d at 837.
"See, e.g., Wolk v. Benefit Ass'n, 172 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Keith
Furnace Co. v. MacVicar, 225 Iowa 246, 28o N.W. 496 (1938); Baker v. Latse,
60 Utah 39, 206 P. 553 (1922).
"See, e.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922); Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
"Zotalis v. Connellos, 138 Minn. 179, 164 N.W. 807 (1917).
"Musco v. Torello, 102 Conn. 346, 128 A. 645 (1925).
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tion.17 Section 2301 of the District of Columbia Housing Code
prohibits the occupation of any building which violates the housing
regulations,' 8 and the Brown court not only emphasized this illegality,
but also relied on an earlier decision that "an illegal contract, made
in violation of a statutory prohibition designed for police or regula-
tory purposes, is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer."' 19
This is true even where the other party entered into the contract
knowing it to violate the statute.20 In addition, it has been held that
a party to an illegal contract cannot ratify it,21 and mere occupancy
of premises will not amount to a ratification of a void lease, absent
some new promise by the lessee.22
It should be noted, however, that private contracts which violate
public police regulations need not always be made void. Although one
state court has held that any agreement which violates a police regula-
tion is void unless the statute contains language from which the con-
trary can be inferred, 2' the United State Supreme Court has en-
couraged courts to use their discretion in determining to what extent
statutory police regulations should affect private contractual rights
conferred upon a wrongdoer.2 4 This decision would seem to be an
exception to the general rule and would suggest that if the legislative
intent is not served, the courts need not allow every minor infraction
of regulations by a landlord to void the landlord's right to rent from
the tenant. The courts might in their discretion modify the contract
so as to make it conform to the statute in question. Another state court
has suggested that legislative intent coupled with the requirements of
public policy should guide the court in deciding whether an other-
wise legal agreement is void.2 5 This approach would seem to prevent
an unscrupulous tenant from taking advantage of an honest landlord
while at the same time forcing an unscrupulous landlord to heed the
housing regulations. It is not clear in Brown whether a minor de-
parture from a housing code would permit the tenant to declare the
lease void or whether only substantial departures can have such an
effect.
"7 Kessler v. Pearson, 126 Ga. 725, 55 S.E. 963 (tgo6).
'
8
WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REGULATION § 2301 (1955). For a statement of
this regulation see Schoshlinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 530 (1966).
'Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
'Kirschner v. Klavik, 186 A.2d 227 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1962).
"City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
"McIntosh v. Lee, 57 Iowa 356, 1o N.W. 895 (1881).
"Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 146 Miss. 862, 11 So. 748 (1927).
'Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421 (1892).
'In re Peterson's Estate, 230 Minn. 478, 42 N.W.2d 59 (1950).
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Brown cannot necessarily be interpreted as a total victory for
tenants in slum areas. To declare the lease void does not, for example,
automatically determine whether rent has to be paid by the tenant.
While mere occupancy of premises does not by itself necessarily imply
a promise by the occupant to pay rent, 26 the general rule still remains
that occupancy of another's premises with the consent of the owner
ordinarily implies some agreement to pay.27 Thus, although the
general rule is that an illegal and void agreement in itself confers
no rights upon either party,2s recovery by the landlord might still
be available under a quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, theory.
29
In such an action by the landlord against the tenant, the recovery
would be limited in some jurisdictions to the reasonable value of
the leasehold for the time the tenant occupied it, regardless of any
agreement in the void lease.30 In other jurisdictions, the landlord
under an obviously illegal lease will not only be precluded from
enforcing the contract, but also be denied any quasi-contractual re-
covery for the value of the benefits conferred. 31 It would seem harsh
in many cases for the courts to allow a tenant to escape liability be-
cause of some minor defect which made the lease invalid. In recogni-
tion of such harsh results, several courts have held that the terms of
a void or defectively executed lease may nevertheless be used to de-
termine the amount of rent which is owed to the landlord.3 2 One
earlier court has reached the same result in a unique manner, stating
that continued occupancy alone is the basis for the creation of a new
kind of tenancy, 33 the terms of which are evidenced perhaps by the
terms of the void lease and by the conduct of the parties.
.3 4
While Brown goes far in helping the wronged tenant, it neverthe-
less leaves several unanswered questions. First, the tenant's defense
3Herron v. Temple, 198 Iowa 1259, 2oo N.W. 917 (1924); Rochelle v. Russ,
54 So. 2d 856 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
-Ross v. City of Longbeach, 24 Cal. 2d 258, 148 P.2d 649 (1944); Goff v.
MacDonald, $33 Mass. 146, 129 N.E.2d 115 (1955); Southern Pac. Co. v. Swanson,
73 Cal. App. 321, 238 P. 736 (1925).
2See, e.g., Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914); Vock v. Vock, 365 Ill. 432,
6 N.E.2d 843 (1937); Smith v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 349 P.2d 646 (Okla. 196o).
"For a discussion of this proposition see 36 U.S.L.W. 1121 (1968).
3OSee Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal. App. 2d 171, 112 P.2d 3o (1941).
aSee generally Lunsford v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 Ala. 679, 141 So. 673 (1932);
Canning v. Bennett, 2o6 Okla. 675, 245 P.2d 1149 (1952); RESTATEMAENT Or CON-
TRACTS, § 598, comment c at 1111 (1932).
*See generally RKO Distrib. Corp. v. Film Center Realty Co., 53 Ohio App.
438, 5 N.E.2d 927 (1936); Cole v. Bunch, 85 Okla. 38, 204 P. ii9 (192i); Snyder v.
Harding, 38 Wash. 666, 8o P. 789 (19o5).
sVinz v. Beatty, 61 Wis. 645, 21 N.W. 787 (1884).1 Saul v. McIntyre, i9o Md. 31, 57 A.2d 272 (1948).
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of a void lease could be, in effect, self-defeating in attempting to force
the landlord to meet code requirements. 3 5 If the tenant used such
a defense to the landlord's suit for rent, the landlord could simply
amend his complaint to ask for removal of the tenant. Thus, it would
seem that retaliation by the landlord and perhaps by even potential
landlords could be a major deterrent to the lone tenant who seeks
to invoke the Brown defense.36 Of course, a collective effort by many
tenants in the same building might provide better bargaining power
in negotiations for repairs and improvements. In addition, the threat
of retaliation by a landlord could perhaps be cured by simply reading
into housing regulations an implied provision protecting the tenant
who complains.37 Such an implied provision would in effect protect
the tenant by giving him a judicially created lease for as long as the
code violation exists.
3 s
Brown does not speak to the problem faced by the tenant when
the leasehold falls into disrepair and into violation of the code after
the lease agreement and during occupancy. The courts have already
interpreted the District of Columbia Housing Regulations to impose
upon the landlord the duty of general maintenance and repair.39
However, one Pennsylvania case has held that housing code violations
are not as such incorporated into the lease and that the tenant could
not complain of breach of these conditions occurring after signing
of the lease and during occupancy. 40 The owner who fails to keep
the leasehold in the condition required by the housing regulations was
once thought to be precluded from bringing any action for rent,
41
but there is authority that the tenant will be held liable for the
reasonable rental value of the premises during his actual time of
occupancy.42 It remains to be seen whether Brown will successfully
be used by the tenant whose leasehold falls into disrepair after the
lease agreement, but it would seem that by further reliance on contract
nSchoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEo. L.J. 519, 538 (1966).
"OIt could be suggested that retaliatory eviction proceedings by the landlord
are a violation of a tenant's constitutional rights to petition for redress of griev-
ances.
'Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEo. L.J. 519, 541 (1966).
Fossum, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 311 (1965).
9National Bank v. Dixon, 3oi F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Whetzel v. Jess
Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
4OKearse v. Spaulding, 4o6 Pa. 140, 176 A.2d 450 (1962).
4 Leuthold v. Stickney, 116 Minn. 299, 133 N.W. 856 (1911).
'-Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1960.
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principles, such an argument might prevail. The general rule is that
where a contract is legal when made but thereafter is deemed void
by statute, further performance is illegal and neither party may recover
for breach of contract.43 Police power statutes may be enacted which
forbid further performance of previously legal agreements and have
the practical effect of terminating existing contracts. 44 When the
leasehold falls into such disrepair as to make occupancy illegal under
the housing codes, the tenant seemingly could seek an extension of
Brown to relieve him from further duties under the lease.
Although the court made no distinction between written and oral
leases, a third possible problem is the great likelihood that in poor
neighborhoods the decision might put an end to written lease agree-
ment. 4 5 When housing is scarce, landlords may refuse to commit them-
selves through formal leases, and complaining tenants will simply not
be allowed to begin another term in the dwelling. The tenant who has
no written lease as security against landlord retaliation for complaints
would certainly find himself in a frustrating position.
The holding in Brown can nevertheless have great influence in the
area of urban housing problems. This decision can serve to protect the
indigent tenant who previously could ill afford to pursue conven-
tional modes of redress against the landlord. It might also insure en-
forcement of housing codes, which in many instances may be necessary
to provide adequate housing for the poor. In addition, in times of
social crisis and turmoil, giving the tenant a legal remedy where one
previously was realistically unavailable can serve to divert potentially
explosive situations into easily managed legal channels.
HUBERT H. YOUNG, JR.
'3See, e.g., Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965).
Massillon Say. & Loan Co. v. Imperial Fin. Co., 114 Ohio St. 523, 151 N.E. 645
(1926).
"Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113 S.W. 364 (198o).
"Vashington Post, Feb. 16, 1968, at Bi, col. i.
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